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ECOWAS’S RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE TO INSTALL
ALASSANE OUATTARA AS PRESIDENT-ELECT
Julie Dubé Gagnon

On January 6, 2011, President-elect Alassane Ouattara of Côte
d’Ivoire requested the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to intervene in order to remove incumbent Laurent
Gbagbo, who refused to leave power following the democratic
presidential elections of November 2010.
In December 2010,
ECOWAS gave a final ultimatum to Laurent Gbagbo to comply with its
request on ceding his throne. Otherwise, ECOWAS warned, it would
be compelled to use legitimate force to serve the demands of the
Ivorian people. This Article ascertains the illegality of a military
intervention for pro-democratic motives in light of the current postelection crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. ECOWAS could not have lawfully
intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in order to install Alassane Ouattara
because such use of military force contravenes the U.N. Charter, and
permitting such derogation would destabilize international peace and
security.
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INTRODUCTION
The right to intervene using military force by a regional organization
for pro-democratic motives animates heated debate among international legal
scholars. Indeed, many seemingly irreconcilable issues arise when assessing
the legality of such an intervention without prior blessing from the United
Nations (U.N.) Security Council. The question was raised on January 6, 2011,
when President-elect Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire requested the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervene in order
to remove incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to leave power following
the presidential elections of November 2010.1
In order to ascertain the legality of a pro-democratic intervention (PDI)
in light of the recent post-electoral context of Côte d’Ivoire, Part I of this
Article exposes the facts behind the escalation of turmoil and the request for an
ECOWAS involvement. Part II subsequently lays out the legal framework
under the U.N. Charter to which military force conducted by a regional
organization needs to abide. To that end, the U.N. Charter provides that no
such intervention can occur lawfully without prior authorization from the
Security Council. In the present Ivoirian case, no such authorization was
granted. Thus, other avenues advocating for a lawful use of force despite the
Security Council’s lack of approval have been proffered by legal scholarship.
These include the right to intervene under the PDI doctrine, which will be
1

See Opposition to Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Eroding: ECOWAS, AGENCE FR. PRESSE
ENGLISH WIRE, Feb. 8, 2011, available at WL NewsRoom.
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discussed in Part III. Part IV presents the proposal for a lawful intervention
pursuant to a developed African regional custom that would translate as
meeting the requirements of Article 53 of the U.N. Charter.2
Further, Part V of this Article is divided in two sections. The first
section of Part V argues issues of consent expressed following the paradigm of
intervention by invitation. Proponents of military intervention by a regional
organization argue that the de jure head of state, here President-elect Ouattara,
can lawfully request and invite foreign military intervention. Conversely,
adherents of the opposing view contend that only the head of state in effective
control (de facto), incumbent Gbagbo, can legally request military action.
Unfortunately, international law is not clear in that regard. The second section
discusses the views that no such Security Council authorization is required
because Côte d’Ivoire has consented to military intervention by adhering to the
ECOWAS treaties, which permit the use of force in order to restore democracy
and peace in the region. Finally, Part VI of this Article concludes with a
necessity argument, suggesting that ECOWAS is not the best-suited actor to
intervene if such intervention were to be found lawful.
This Article overall concludes that ECOWAS could not have lawfully
intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in order to install Alassane Ouattara because such
use of military force contravenes the U.N. Charter, and permitting such
derogation would destabilize international peace and security. This is not to
say however, that there is no need in international law to search for a lawful
compromise between the economy of the U.N. Charter and the human reality
on the ground, oftentimes kept in the shadow of the international community’s
preoccupations.
I.

FACTS

Côte d’Ivoire plunged into civil turmoil in September 2002 when
subversive soldiers attempted to overthrow President Laurent Gbagbo.3
Although the coup failed, it led to the outbreak of wide-scale civil conflict
taking its roots in the ten-year-old animosity that has existed between the
Muslim population of the North and the Christian and Animist populations of
the South.4 In late 2002, de facto partition of the country resulted from the
2

U.N. Charter art. 53 (“[N]o enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council,” with
certain exceptions.).
3
See Jeremy I. Levitt, Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 785,
808–09 (2006) [hereinafter Levitt, PDI in Africa].
4
Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2008), PLOUGHSHARES (Jan. 2009), http://ploughshares.ca/
pl_armedconflict/cote-divoire-2002-2008/ [hereinafter PLOUGHSHARES]. A major source of
this tension is the perceived discrimination of northerners, who contend that they have been
politically marginalized for years. They have been denouncing their isolation since the
exclusion of Alassane Ouattara, originally a popular northern politician, from the 2000
presidential election. The presence of large numbers of immigrants within Côte d’Ivoire has
escalated inter-ethnic tensions and instigated the racist “Ivoirité” movement. “Ivoirité” means
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uprising: the rebels apprehended the northern half of the country while the
government maintained control of the southern part.5 After five years of civil
unrest and unimplemented peace agreements, President Gbagbo and rebel
leader Guillaume Soro signed the Ouagadougou Peace Accord in March 2007.6
In that context, the 2010 presidential elections were meant to advance the
peace process in the country.7
The coastal West African state, however, was once again ravaged by
civil turbulence following incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to
concede defeat against his opponent Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara from
the November 28, 2010, second-round elections.8 Mr. Ouattara’s victory is
strongly backed by the international community, including the U.N., the
African Union, ECOWAS, and the European Union.9 In fact, the President of
the Independent Electoral Commission proclaimed the provisional results of
the second tour on December 2, 2010, declaring that Ouattara had won 54.1%
of the votes while Gbagbo only obtained 45.9%.10 Immediately following the
release of the results, Gbagbo contested them, as the Constitution of Côte
d’Ivoire permits,11 before the Constitutional Council, and the latter proceeded
to declare Gbagbo as the winner after having annulled the results from some
northern regions.12 According to the Constitutional Council, Gbagbo garnered
51.45% of the votes while Ouattara only obtained 48.55%.13 Gbagbo,
therefore, claims to have been duly elected and refuses to hand power over to
Ouattara. Following these conflicting electoral outcomes, both Ouattara and
Gbagbo took oaths of office.14
Meeting on December 24, 2010, ECOWAS heads of state, after
determining that Gbagbo had not heeded their demand that he cede the
presidency, decided to “make an ultimate gesture to Mr. Gbagbo by urging him
to make a peaceful exit.”15 They dispatched a delegation to deliver an

“Ivorian,” with a very racist connotation. Many workers from neighboring countries have
migrated to Côte d’Ivoire to work in the agricultural sector. Id.
5
See Levitt, PDI in Africa, supra note 3, at 809.
6
Ouagadougou Political Agreement, U.N. Doc. S/2007/144 (Mar. 13, 2007). See also
PLOUGHSHARES, supra note 4.
7
See Post-election Crisis, U.N. OPERATIONS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE [UNOCI],
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2013)
[hereinafter UNOCI].
8
Id. The first round of elections was held on October 31, 2010, and because no majority
result was reached, a second round of elections took place pursuant to the Ivoirian
Constitution. Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D’IVOIRE, Loi No 2000-513 §§ 34–38
(2000), available at http://www.la-constitution-en-afrique.org/article-21220503.html.
12
See UNOCI, supra note 7.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
ECOWAS, Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government
on Côte d’Ivoire, Final Communiqué, ¶ 9, ECW/CEG/ABJ/EXT/FR./Rev. 0 (Dec. 24 2010),
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ultimatum reiterating ECOWAS’s demand and to offer to escort him into exile
abroad.16 “In the event that Mr. Gbagbo fails to heed this immutable demand,”
they further decided that ECOWAS “would be left with no alternative but to
take other measures, including the use of legitimate force, to achieve the goals
of the Ivorian people.”17 In light of the aforementioned, does ECOWAS have
a right to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire using force in order to instate the
internationally recognized de jure President-elect, Alassane Ouattara?
II.

ECOWAS, AS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION, HAS NO RIGHT TO
INTERVENE UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER

The imposition of democracy on President-elect Ouattara through force
in Côte d’Ivoire by a regional organization such as ECOWAS is difficult to
reconcile with the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits
member states of the United Nations to use force against any state. 18 The
Charter identifies two exceptions to this general prohibition on the use of force.
First, under Chapter VII, Article 39 states that the U.N. Security Council shall
determine whether a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression exists.19 If the Security Council determines the existence of any of
these three scenarios, Article 42 permits it to authorize the use of force to
maintain or restore international peace and security in the event that other
actions not involving armed force are ineffective.20 The second exception is at
Article 51, which preserves a nation’s “inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”21 By its terms, Article 51 indicates
that there must be an armed attack before a state can respond with force.
Accordingly, for the imposition of democracy through force to be legal under
this provision, it would have to be in response to an armed attack.
The Charter also makes explicit that this prohibition against the use of
force applies with equal force to regional arrangements.22 To that end, Article
52 recognizes that regional arrangements may play a role in the maintenance of
international peace and security, but the Charter also affirms the primacy of the
Security Council in that regard.23 Article 53 provides for the Security Council
to exercise control over any regional enforcement action by emphasizing that
available
at
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/communique_final/session_extra/
Communique_Final_CI_election.pdf.
16
Id.
17
Id. ¶ 10.
18
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
19
Id. art. 39.
20
Id. art. 42.
21
Id. art. 51.
22
Id. art. 52, para. 1.
23
Id. art. 52.
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“no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”24
Further, Article 54 requires regional organizations to keep the Security Council
apprised “of activities undertaken or in contemplation . . . for the maintenance
of international peace and security.”25
The plain language of these articles makes clear that while the Charter
permits or even encourages regional organizations to take measures to protect
regional peace, it does not grant regional organizations the authority to use
force without obtaining prior Security Council authorization.26 Although
Article 52 encourages states to use regional organizations for the “pacific
settlement” of disputes, it does entail military options.27 Applying this
framework to the case of Côte d’Ivoire, there has been no such armed attack28
as required by Article 51; thus, the only lawful avenue for ECOWAS to
intervene under the Charter’s authority would be to act pursuant to the prior
authorization of the Security Council or by invitation. The latter issue will be
discussed later in this Article. At the time of writing, however, the U.N.
Security Council has not authorized such military intervention to take place,
neither by ECOWAS nor by other forces. Is there, however, state practice or
regional custom permitting regional organizations to intervene without the
Security Council’s authorization?
There are three possible answers to this question. First, scholars have
argued that under the PDI doctrine, such interventions could be lawful.
Second, the PDI doctrine has been closely discussed with the emerging African
regional custom to intervene despite lack of Security Council authorization.
Third, scholarly work has also suggested that Security Council approval is not
required in such cases because consent from the inviting state is implicit by the
adherence of treaties permitting military intervention for the maintenance of
democracy, or even, that the consent given by the de jure head of state is
sufficient to translate into a lawful invitation to intervene. Part III discusses
these arguments advocating for a right to intervene despite Security Council
authorization.

24

Id. art. 53.
Id. art. 54.
26
See Peter E. Harrell, Note, Modern-Day “Guarantee Clauses” and the Legal Authority
of Multinational Organizations to Authorize the Use of Military Force, 33 YALE J. INT’L L.
417, 422 (2008).
27
Id. See also U.N. Charter art. 52.
28
As of December 24, 2010, however, before ECOWAS’s demand to intervene in Côte
d’Ivoire, it can be implied that there was fighting. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, CÔTE D’IVOIRE:
SIX
MONTHS
OF
POST-ELECTORAL
VIOLENCE
(2011),
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR31/003/2011/en/cee4c3da-2f40-4575-8d9f-f1aee
7bf483b/afr310032011en.pdf (documenting serious violence that followed the disputed
November 2010 presidential election).
25
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RIGHT TO USE MILITARY FORCE UNDER THE PRO-DEMOCRATIC
INTERVENTION DOCTRINE: NOT A LAWFUL AVENUE FOR ECOWAS

Military intervention in the name of democracy has attracted much
attention in the legal literature on democracy and the use of force in
international law. According to the PDI doctrine, states would be entitled to
use force against another state in order to overthrow a non-democratic
government.29 There are two opposing views regarding the legality of using
force under the PDI doctrine. First, the most promising, having Jeremy I.
Levitt as its major proponent, argues that in Africa, a norm of PDI has
crystallized through the consent doctrine and customary regional law. 30 In his
view, state practice and treaty law in Africa indicate that PDI
[i]s an intervention by a state, group of states, or regional
organization in another state involving the threat or use of force
in order to protect or restore a democratically constituted
government from unlawful and/or violent seizures of power,
especially when the circumstances that underpin such seizures
threaten a substantial part of a state’s population with death or
suffering on a grand scale.31
According to him, PDI is typically based on state consent, whether treatybased or ad hoc, or authorized by the Security Council.32 Further, PDI can be
conducted through regional organizations, such as ECOWAS.33 Levitt notes
that the three most authoritative legal sources that provide for a norm of PDI in
Africa are found in African state practice, treaty law, and regional
organizational practice.34 This section of the Article, however, determines that
there is no such state practice and opinio juris justifying a right to PDI in
general, whereas Part IV of this Article, as noted, will focus on the regional
custom argument and Part V on the consent issue.
Opposing views to Levitt have argued that PDI “rarely constitutes an
autonomous justification for the use of force that would otherwise be illegal.”35
In that regard, practice has shown that “it is usually invoked to complement
other arguments when circumstances leave great doubts as to the legality of the
impugned action.”36 Such was the case in Grenada, Panama and Iraq, where
international forces have intervened in the name of “democracy.” These cases
29

See Jean d’Aspremont, Mapping the Concepts Behind the Contemporary Liberalization
of the Use of Force in International Law, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1089, 1125 (2010) [hereinafter
d’Aspremont, Mapping].
30
Levitt, PDI in Africa, supra note 3, at 788–89.
31
Id. at 789.
32
Id. at 792.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 788–89, 793 n.29.
35
D’Aspremont, Mapping, supra note 29, at 1110.
36
Id.
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will be discussed shortly. Thus, according to Jean d’Aspremont, the concept of
PDI “has failed to garner enough support to constitute a new customary
limitation to the prohibition on the use of force.”37 Indeed, in practical legal
terms, pro-democratic interventions are difficult to reconcile with the
prohibition on the use of force of Article 2(4).38 To date, the majority of legal
scholars, including Louis Henkin, Oscar Schachter, and Jean d’Aspremont,
consider PDI in the absence of Security Council authorization incompatible
with the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention
and thus illegal under contemporary international law.39
Despite this legal impasse requiring Security Council authorization, it
has been averred that there is a need “to seek a legal construction reconciling
the right to [PDI] with the prohibition on the use of force of Article 2(4) and
with state practice” in light of the “positive” international reactions to military
interventions for such democratic purposes.40 This search for a new
reconciliation is justified according to legal scholarship by the need to maintain
international law in compliance with the realities on the terrain of international
relations.41 In fact, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) stated in 1991 that
such consistency ensures the “effectiveness of the international legal order by
providing stability to the inherently fragile international system.”42 The
examples that are hereby illustrated, however, propose that there might not be
such opinio juris proclaiming the legality of pro-democratic interventions in
absence of Security Council authorization even though the aim of the
interventions—to promote democracy—is legitimate.
The first case where democracy was used as a justification for military
use of force was the Grenada intervention.43 American troops, with the
support of the Organisation of East Caribbean States, invaded Grenada in
October 1983 in response to a coup d’état against the government of Maurice
Bishop.44 In three days, they managed to overthrow the coup.45 Subsequent to
this intervention orchestrated in the absence of Security Council authorization,
37

Id. at 1110–11.
See Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy:
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 321, 379 n.334 (1998).
39
See, e.g., d’Aspremont, Mapping, supra note 29, at 1110; Louis Henkin, Use of Force:
Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 44
(Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1991); Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 38, at 379; Oscar
Schachter, Editorial Comment, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Intervention, 78 AM. J. INT’L
L. 645, 649 (1984).
40
See Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 38, at 379. See also Wolfgang Friedmann, The
Changing Dimensions of International Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1155 (1962).
41
See Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 38, at 379.
42
Id. at 379–80 (citing Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 173, 178 (Apr. 11)).
43
See John Burgess, Most Residents of Nearby Barbados Appear to Support Grenada
Invasion, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1983, at A15, cited in Niels Petersen, The Principle of
Democratic Teleology in International Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 33, 72 (2008).
44
See id.
45
Id.
38
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legal scholars, such as Brad R. Roth, have argued that restoring democracy was
a sufficient legal justification.46 Several important facts, however, mitigate this
position. As such, the U.N. General Assembly, subsequent to the U.S.-led
operation, condemned the intervention as illegal by an overwhelming majority
of 108 states against twenty-seven.47 The General Assembly emphasized that
is was “[d]eeply deplor[ing] the armed intervention in Grenada, which
constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State.”48 It is noteworthy to
mention that the majority of African states voted in favor of this resolution.49
Although Resolutions of the General Assembly are not directly binding in law,
they are certainly an expression of opinio juris that the U.S.-led operation
cannot be regarded as a precedent for a right to PDI.50
The U.S. offensive in Panama is a second possible precedent for the
idea that democracy may justify military intervention.51 On December 20,
1989, the U.S. military invaded Panama with 14,000 troops in order to
overthrow Manuel Noriega because he had nullified the election results of his
opponent.52 At the time, President Bush explicitly justified the action on the
basis of protecting democracy, among other secondary justifications, such as
combating drug trafficking.53 It could be argued that the Panama case is even
stronger than the Grenada example, considering that the request for
intervention came from Guillermo Endara who was formally elected by the
Panamanian people but was kept out by Noriega. The U.N. General Assembly,
however, again severely condemned the intervention by an outstanding
majority vote.54 It stated that it “[s]trongly deplores the intervention in Panama
by the armed forces of the United States of America, which constitutes a
flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of States.”55 Thus, similar to Grenada, the intervention

46

See BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 309
(1999).
47
G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/7 (Nov. 2, 1983); Resolutions Adopted by the
General Assembly at Its 38th Session, U.N. (2010), http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/
r38.htm.
48
G.A. Res. 38/7, supra note 47, ¶ 1.
49
See Petersen, supra note 43, at 73.
50
Id. (citing SCOTT DAVIDSON, GRENADA: A STUDY IN POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (1987)).
51
Compare W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies,
19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 794, 800–01 (1995), with Anthony D’Amato, The Invasion of Panama
Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 519 (1990).
52
See Petersen, supra note 43, at 73.
53
See Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1722–23, ¶ 2 (Dec. 20, 1989).
54
G.A. Res. 44/240, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240 (Dec. 29, 1989). The vote was 75-20-40.
See Petersen, supra note 43, at 74.
55
G.A. Res. 44/240, supra note 54, ¶ 1.
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in Panama should not serve as evidence of a right to intervene for prodemocratic motives in international law.56
Lastly, the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is the most recent case
in which regime change for democracy was invoked as a justification for
military intervention without obtaining prior authorization from the Security
Council.57 In their official justification for the war, neither the United States
nor the United Kingdom mentioned regime change as the principle reason for
intervention.58
Instead, they justified the intervention by interpreting
Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441 of the U.N. Security Council.59 Human rights
were also invoked as a justification for intervention, but Vice President Cheney
adhered to the neo-colonial ideology, which championed PDI.60 Nonetheless,
a considerable part of the international community condemned the intervention
including Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, and Russia.61 The Iraq War,
therefore, cannot be regarded as a precedent for the emergence of a norm of
pro-democratic intervention.
In addition, other conceptual problems may arise when considering PDI
as a lawful avenue for military intervention. This Article, however, does not
carry the pretention to resolve these issues. It is worth noting, in any case, that
the debate over the significance of democracy and its legitimacy in
international law is not yet resolved.62 Many scholars think about the idea of
democracy as a legal principle or in terms of a “right to democratic

56

See Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross
Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 293, 298 (1991).
57
See Robert F. Turner, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Legal and Policy Considerations, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 765, 778 (2004).
58
See Dino Kritsiotis, Arguments of Mass Confusion, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 233, 271, 273–
74 (2004).
59
S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991); S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). See also
Permanent Rep. of the U.S., Letter from the Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N. Addressed
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 20, 2003) (by John D.
Negroponte); Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General, Parliamentary Answer on the Legal Basis for
the
Use
of
Force
Against
Iraq
(Mar.
17,
2003),
available
at
http://guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/mar/11/politics.iraq?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.
60
See David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: The White House; Bush
Orders Start of War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2003,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/20/world/threats-responses-white-housebush-orders-start-war-iraq-missiles-apparently.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; War in Iraq:
Not a Humanitarian Intervention, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 26, 2004),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/01/25/war-iraq-not-humanitarian-intervention.
61
See Elizabeth Bumiller, White House Letter; Who’s Cool at the Group of 8 Meeting?
It’s All in Bush’s Gestures, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2003, at A8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/02/world/white-house-letter-who-s-cool-group-8-meeting-its-all-bush-s-gestures.html.
62
See RICHARD BURCHILL, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). See also Jean
d’Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 877 (2006) [hereinafter d’Aspremont, Legitimacy].
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governance.”63 According to Thomas M. Franck, the right is based on the
theory that governments derive their powers from the consent of the
governed.64 This requires an electoral process characterized by public
participation.65 Thus, an important manifestation of this right is conducting
free and fair elections, but the meaning of the latter concept is also a source of
debate in legal scholarship.66
This section of the Article thus concludes that state practice concerning
the norm of pro-democratic intervention is far from conclusive and that opinio
juris does not provide strong support for the existence of such a right under
international law. In response to this, Levitt has argued that African states and
regional organizations have nonetheless “adopted, operationalized, and acted
under norm-creating mechanisms that are eroding traditional prohibitions on
the use of force” provided for in the U.N. Charter and general international
law.67 He contends that Africa is the first region to evolve with a
comprehensive collective security framework.68 Part IV of this Article will
thus assess whether ECOWAS could intervene in Côte d’Ivoire following
African regional custom in that regard.
IV.

NO AFRICAN REGIONAL CUSTOM PERMITTING INTERVENTION

If ECOWAS cannot intervene in Côte d’Ivoire, justifying its action
under the PDI doctrine in general, it may possibly do so under a regional
practice justification. Levitt has stated that although it may be too early to
claim that a right to PDI clearly exists under customary international law, as
discussed in Part III of this Article, its recognition in customary regional law in
Africa is “timely and futuristic.”69 This section of the Article, however, will
argue that no such regional custom prevails in Africa, and even if it did,
subsequent practice cannot develop in contravention of the U.N. Charter. The
interventions by ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia are examples
frequently cited by scholars who argue that the Security Council approved the
interventions ex post facto, thus contributing to the emerging regional norm.70
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The Sierra Leone and Liberia case studies, however, are also illustrations of
unlawful military interventions.71
In July 1990, President Samuel Doe, de jure President, sent a letter
inviting ECOWAS to introduce peacekeeping forces in Liberia.72 Charles
Taylor, who had effective control of Liberia, refused to consent to any
ECOWAS action.73 The Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a cease-fire monitoring group, was then
created as a peacekeeping force and did not purport to obtain consent of both
parties to the conflict before intervening.74 The intervention was an
enforcement action rather than one keeping peace because there was no peace
to keep yet.75 The 1990 ECOWAS enforcement action to establish peace in
Liberia was conducted without Security Council authorization.76 The
international community, however, reacted in a positive manner because the
aim of the intervention was morally legitimate.77 Because of this, international
actors disregarded the flagrant deviation from Article 53 of the U.N. Charter
and commended ECOWAS for its broad efforts to establish peace in Liberia.78
For the first time, a few months after the intervention, in January 1991,
the Security Council considered the Liberian conflict.79 As such, the President
of the Security Council issued a statement commending ECOWAS’s efforts to
“promote peace and normalcy in Liberia.”80 In November 1992, more than a
year after the intervention, the Security Council adopted its first resolution
which “[c]ommend[ed] ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security and
stability in Liberia.”81
The legal basis for ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia was hardly
discussed by the Security Council.82 For its part, the ECOWAS Standing
71
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Mediation Committee appeared to justify the intervention in broad
humanitarian and regional security terms.83 The consistency with Article 53 of
the U.N. Charter was never raised.84 Some scholars, however, have interpreted
the Security Council’s applause as retroactive authorization for such purposes
of Article 53.85 This interpretation has been criticized as not being completely
honest.86 In fact, the Security Council’s commendations do not constitute
retroactive authorization for purposes of Article 53 of the U.N. Charter because
it did not authorize any enforcement action.87 Moreover, by the time the
Security Council adopted its first resolution, the issue of Security Council
authorization was moot because by then, ECOWAS had successfully
negotiated peace accords in Liberia.88 According to David Wippman, the
Security Council then endorsed the peace accords without commenting on the
unauthorized enforcement action that brought it about.89 Additionally, it has
been suggested that the failure to authorize the use of force was deliberate
because the Security Council had no intention to pay for such action.90
Similarly to the Liberian case, ECOWAS, under ECOMOG, intervened
in Sierra Leone in June 1997 and reinstated Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as President
in March 1998.91 A peace accord was signed in 1996 as an outcome of the
civil war, and as a result, presidential elections took place, from which Kabbah
was elected.92 The cease-fire and peace accords, however, did not create a
détente but rather furthered tension, and on May 25, 1997, a military junta
overthrew Kabbah.93 Again, ECOWAS did not request Security Council
authorization.94 The Security Council, in Resolution 1132, only retroactively
expressed its support for the ECOWAS action in October 1997,95 and later, in
Resolution 1156, it welcomed Kabbah’s return to office.96
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Some authors have raised doubts concerning the democratic intentions
of the intervening states, noting that Nigeria, the leader of the intervention, was
itself ruled by an autocratic government.97 Niels Petersen, however, suggests
that in evaluating the intervention as a precedent of a democracy principle
emerging in a region, the reaction of the international community is more
significant than the legality of the intervention itself.98 He argues that
Resolution 1132 requested the military junta to reinstate democratic order
whereas Resolution 1156 welcomed the country’s return to democracy.99 In
his view, therefore, the case of Sierra Leone confirms the existence of a
principle of pro-democratic intervention for the purposes of peace and security
in the region.100
One could argue, however, that Resolution 1132 does not generally
authorize ECOWAS to take military measures to remove the junta in Sierra
Leone.101 In fact, the legitimization of the use of force in the Resolution is
limited to ensuring the strict implementation of the economic embargo.102 In
addition, some authors have argued that the Security Council is not required to
authorize Article 53 enforcement actions before such actions are actually
carried out.103 According to this stance, an authorization by the Security
Council at any stage should be understood as an implicit authorization of the
prior actions undertaken by the regional organization.104 Such a general
understanding of after-the-fact authorization under Article 53, however, is
incompatible with the requirement that the Security Council exercise effective
control over regional enforcement actions.105 Authors have argued that control
necessarily includes the power to prevent enforcement actions and that the
Security Council will thus only preserve effective control through prior
authorization.106
Conversely, it could also be argued, pursuant to Article 31(2)(b) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that subsequent practice can
change the interpretation of a treaty,107 here the U.N. Charter. The I.C.J.
expressed this clearly in its November 1950 judgment in Colombia v. Peru in
the following terms: “The Party which relies on a custom of this kind
97
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[regional or local custom] must prove that this custom is established in such a
manner that it has become binding on the other Party.”108 This practice,
however, cannot be applied in the case of regional custom for PDI without
prior authorization from Security Council because the U.N. is considered here
as one of the parties to the treaty. As such, a regional custom cannot emerge in
violation of the U.N. Charter. Any other interpretation of Article 53 results in
legal uncertainty at the time of the action.109 Further, the use of ex post facto
authorization may also encourage regional organizations to initiate military
actions with the expectation that the Security Council would grant its blessing
afterwards.110
Accordingly, in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, although the
ultimate result of the ECOWAS actions—peace—may be commendable
notwithstanding years of armed conflict, the long term stability of the
international system requires regional organizations to act within the
framework set out in the U.N. Charter. As such, ECOWAS, not having
Security Council authorization at hand, cannot intervene in Côte d’Ivoire under
an argument of African regional custom permitting such action despite the
requirements of Article 53 of the U.N. Charter not being met. Because
Ouattara has requested for such intervention to take place, is his consent
sufficient in international law to qualify the use of force as legitimate?
CÔTE D’IVOIRE INVITED ECOWAS
LAWFULLY GIVE CONSENT?

V.

A.

TO

INTERVENE:

WHO CAN

Invitation by De Jure vs. De Facto Head of State: Ouattara or
Gbagbo?

As noted, Ouattara requested by letter on January 6, 2011, an
ECOWAS-led intervention with the aim to install him as President.111
Ouattara appears to be the de jure President-elect, while Gbagbo the de facto
President in effective control. The I.C.J. has confirmed in the case of the
Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua that a state can call upon
another state to assist it and consent to the use of force by the latter on its
territory.112 The possibility of inviting another state to use force on one’s own
territory was again confirmed in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo case.113 Thus, this is not a limitation to the prohibition on the use of
108
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force in the same sense as self-defense because the prohibition on the use of
force only prohibits the use of military action without consent.114 In fact, once
the host state consents, the use of force is not in contradiction with the
territorial integrity of the host state and accordingly does not violate Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter.115 In light of this, it should be determined, in the
context of Côte d’Ivoire, who exactly has the right to give legitimate consent.
This was found to be a difficult task.
Levitt argues that whether a government is in effective control does not
seem to seriously impede the legality and legitimacy of a PDI intervention.116
If PDI is based on state consent, it seeks to uphold democratically elected
governments irrespective of who is in de facto control because the intervention
is on behalf of the government that obtained power democratically or is
otherwise considered legitimate.117 According to Levitt’s view, even ousted
regimes lacking effective control can make a valid request for intervention.118
In Africa, therefore, the democratic entitlement that underlies PDI is
challenging the traditional conceptions of the effective control doctrine.
In that regard, David Wippman notes that under conventional reading
of international law, effective control is an essential—perhaps the only—
component of a government’s authority to represent a state in the course of
international relations.119 Reliance on effective control serves important
purposes in the international legal order. Wippman argues that it precludes
states from too readily ignoring the autonomy of other states and from too
easily justifying interventions that are self-interested or likely to result in the
internationalization of an internal dispute.120 Control, therefore, ordinarily
affords de facto leaders a partial, if not exclusive, claim to speak in the name of
the state.121
In line with Levitt’s view, however, the growing importance of criteria
for democratic legitimacy in international law122 diluted the requirement of
effectivité of the government issuing the invitation.123 The democratic
legitimacy of a government has typically offset its poor effectivité.124
According to d’Aspremont, this indicates that the effectivité of the government
giving the invitation no longer constitutes the overarching condition of the
validity of the consent to the intervention of another state.125 In fact, this
114
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finding seems implied by the I.C.J. in its decision in the Armed Activities case
in the Congo, which never questioned whether the Congolese government was
effective enough to validly invite other states to use force on its territory. 126
This might explain why democratic governments, which do not exercise an
effective control over the territory of the state, seem to be entitled to validly
invite another state to forcefully intervene, such as in the case of Sierra
Leone.127 D’Aspremont, however, argues that democratic legitimacy can be
subject to manipulations and abusive interpretation, and as such, “the
possession of certain democratic trappings sometimes seems to suffice to
endow an ineffective government with the power to invite a foreign state to
intervene.”128 In this way, reducing the requirements for validly consenting to
the forceful intervention of another state further dilutes the general prohibition
on the use of force.129
Similarly, by seeking to answer whether a democratically elected
government and popularly supported government can consent to military
intervention against the wish of de facto authorities more or less in control of
the state, Wippman concludes with an unclear answer.130 In the case at hand,
Gbagbo is in effective control, but Ouattara seems to have gained the support
of the international community and, in the same fashion, of the population.
Due to the closeness of the votes, however, it is difficult to determine which
candidate carries more endorsement by the population. Wippman suggests that
“[i]n some cases . . . mechanical reliance on effective control as a proxy for
authority to represent the State seems to serve no useful purpose other than
helping to preserve the rule.”131 He notes that “any use of force that on
balance is welcomed by a majority of a State’s population should be treated as
[lawful] under international law.”132 This prong is “too subjective and too
subject to abuse,”133 as also noted by d’Aspremont. On the other hand, when
the majority of the population gives support to the ousted de jure government
not in control, their invitation should receive some legitimacy.134
This Article thus takes the stance that Gbagbo, in effective control, has
the sole authority to give consent to military force because the facts are not
clear in terms of whom the population, by a high majority, supports. Even
though the international community supports Ouattara as President-elect, the
use of force might not be the most justifiable means to resolve the issue at
hand. It is important to recall that the U.N. Charter, in that sense, permits the
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use of force in situations of urgency only.135 Can consent to use military force,
however, be implied by the mere adherence to the ECOWAS treaties?
B.

Treaty-based Consent

Levitt has argued that in Africa, a norm of PDI has crystallized notably
through the consent doctrine, whether treaty-based or ad hoc.136 In fact, in the
Liberia case, ECOWAS cited treaties as part of its justification for the
intervention.137 It is thus possible, in the event of an ECOWAS intervention in
Côte d’Ivoire, that such justifications be asserted.
International law supports the notion that states can enter into guarantee
clauses that legitimate the use of force within their territory under specified
circumstances.138 Such treaty clauses, however, cannot be applicable if they
are inconsistent with the U.N. Charter. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter states
that “[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.”139 Thus, if ECOWAS were to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to a
treaty agreement authorizing the use of force, it cannot do so in violation of the
principles enshrined in the Charter pertaining to the prohibition on the use of
force. An examination of the treaty provisions will demonstrate this.
In December 1999, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol Establishing the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping
and Security (“Conflict Protocol”), of which Côte d’Ivoire is a member
state.140 The Conflict Protocol recognizes that peace, security, stability,
democracy, and good governance are central to the development of the West
African region.141 In fact, one of its key objectives is to protect member states
from being “affected by the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a
democratically elected government.”142 It also affirms its commitment to
promoting and consolidating democratic government and institutions in each
member state, supporting processes for the political restoration of collapsed
governments or those that have been seriously eroded and protecting
fundamental human rights and freedoms.143 Additionally, the ECOWAS
Conflict Protocol aims to prevent, manage, and resolve internal and interstate
135
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conflict.144 Furthermore, Article 10 gives the ECOWAS Mediation and
Security Council the power to “authorise all forms of intervention [including]
the deployment of . . . military missions.”145 Article 22 of the Conflict
Protocol states that peacekeeping and the restoration of peace, humanitarian
intervention during humanitarian disasters, and the enforcement of sanctions,
including embargoes, are key responsibilities of ECOMOG.146
Article 25 of the Conflict Protocol provides that ECOWAS may take
enforcement action in internal conflicts: (1) that “threaten[] to trigger a
humanitarian disaster or that pose[] a serious threat to peace and security in the
sub-region”; (2) where there has been a “serious and massive violation of
human rights and the rule of law”; and (3) when there has been an “overthrow
or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.” 147 Article 26
also grants the authority to initiate actions by ECOMOG to the Mediation and
Security Council, a requesting member state, the African Union, or the U.N.148
In light of this framework, ECOWAS does not itself have the authority
without the Security Council to intervene with military force. Thus, if
ECOWAS were to justify its intervention because Côte d’Ivoire consented to
the Conflict Protocol, it unlawfully conflicts with the U.N. Charter because
express authorization from the Security Council is not derivable. The Conflict
Protocol further frustrates the correct application of the doctrine of consent by
its clear conflict with the operation of consent as set out by the I.C.J. decision
in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case.149 According to
this decision, a state may withdraw its consent at any time after it has been
given, and such withdrawal need not be done by any formal means—a mere
statement is sufficient.150 The Conflict Protocol does not provide any means
by which a member state may revoke its consent short of withdrawing from the
Conflict Protocol. As set out by Article 56 of the Conflict Protocol,
withdrawal is a formal process whereby a member state must submit a written
notice to the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.151 Once submitted, the state
continues to be bound by the Protocol for one year. Thus, even if a member
state were to give notice of withdrawal, its consent would be considered to
continue, and ECOWAS would retain the authority to deploy ECOMOG into
its territory for another year. Wippman contends that the “will of the State at
the moment of intervention should prevail over the will of the State at the
moment of treaty formation.”152 A state’s grant of authority should be
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“impressed with an implicit but limited right of revocation.”153 Thus, the
provisions of the Conflict Protocol create an unlawful restriction on the right of
a state to withdraw at any time its consent to the use of force on its territory by
another state. This is further evidence that ECOWAS may not justify its
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to the theory of consent because the
treaty’s terms contravene the essence of the U.N. Charter, and in such case, the
Charter must prevail.154
VI.

ECOWAS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE FORCE TO INTERVENE

In closing, even if the use of force by ECOWAS were lawful under a
right to pro-democratic intervention, this fact cannot supersede other principles
of international law governing the use of force. The use of force can only be
used as a last resort in the jus ad bellum.155 In fact, armed force must be
necessary to achieve the objective sought,156 which is, here, the installment of
President-elect Ouattara. In the past decade, however, the African Union has
been consistent in various cases, including Togo, Mauritania, Madagascar, and
Niger, in deploying non-military means, such as sanctions, mediation, and
negotiation, to resolve those situations.157 All such means of resolving a
situation must be exhausted before a state or a group of states, such as
ECOWAS, may exercise force.158 In the case at hand, several sanctions are
currently in place against Côte d’Ivoire in order to pressure Gbagbo to step
down.159 These include limitations on the trade of diamonds, other economic
sanctions, and diplomatic measures.160 As a result, it is too soon to conclude
that all other means have been exhausted such that resort to force is the only
option left.
Additionally, the presence of U.N. and French forces in Côte d’Ivoire,
currently numbering 11,033 uniformed personnel,161 defeats the argument that
military actions by ECOWAS is necessary. These forces are in Côte d’Ivoire
pursuant to the authorization of the Security Council,162 and should the
153
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Security Council decide that military intervention is necessary, these forces are
well equipped to carry out such orders.163 Because these forces are already in
place, and at the command of the Security Council, they are capable of taking
the same actions that ECOWAS would; in that regard, it is not necessary for
ECOWAS to intervene. Further, it is uncertain if ECOWAS has the means to
intervene.164 Ghana, for instance, “declined to participate in a potential
intervention, citing an overburden of international peacekeeping deployments
in other regions.”165 “Nigeria is also thought to have domestic security
concerns of its own following the recent elections that might preclude it from
contributing forces.”166 It is doubtful under the circumstances whether
ECOWAS is truly the proper actor to intervene.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study has shown that ECOWAS may not lawfully intervene in
Côte d’Ivoire in order to install Alassane Ouattara without prior authorization
from the Security Council. In fact, neither customary law nor opinio juris
allows for such pro-democratic action to take place without fulfillment of
Article 53 of the U.N. Charter. In addition, although international law permits
de jure heads of states to give consent for military intervention in some
situations, such as when the grand majority of the population gives support to
the ousted leader, it has been argued that Gbagbo, in effective control, is the
mere authority to bestow proper consent. In fact, the assessment of the support
from the population is a subjective appreciation that may lead to abuse and
international disorder. Furthermore, the mere fact that Côte d’Ivoire adheres to
the ECOWAS treaty allowing for military action does not preclude the
application of the requirements set out in the U.N. Charter. Finally, it is
questionable whether ECOWAS would be the proper entity to intervene if
military use of force were authorized.
In closing, despite the fact that, at this time, an ECOWAS intervention
would appear to be unlawful, this Article advocates for a search of consensus
in order to properly address humanitarian crises in times when the Security
Council appears silent or hesitant to intervene. Lobel and Ratner have argued
that the inability of the Security Council to authorize force when some believe
163
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it to be clearly needed propels the search for implied authorizations.167 The
example of Rwanda is compelling in that regard.168 That said, this Article
could have analyzed the possible intervention of ECOWAS in light of the
humanitarian crisis currently unwinding in Côte d’Ivoire169 and could have
discussed military force under the responsibility to protect doctrine.170 In the
interest of peace, however, it is too early, as of 2013, to conclude that the use
of force is the only method to resolve the post-election crisis.
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